

Graph Ranking & The Cost of Sybil Defense

Gwen
Farach-Colton
Rutgers University
USA

Martín
Farach-Colton
Rutgers University
USA

Leslie Ann
Goldberg
Oxford University
UK

Hanna Komlós
Rutgers University
USA


John Lapinskas
Bristol University
UK

Reut Levi
Reichman Univeristy
Israel


Moti Medina
Bar-Ilan University
Israel

Miguel Mosteiro
Pace University
USA


Schematic of how search engines work:




Schematic of how search engines work:




Schematic of how search engines work:




Schematic of how search engines work:



Schematic of how search engines work:




Schematic of how search engines work:



rank scores are a function
of web graph, not query


Schematic of how search engines work:




Schematic of how search engines work:



Schematic of how search engines work:



Schematic of how search engines work:



Formalize game between **web ranker**  and **spammer** 

Define two critical criteria:

- **spam resistance:** how well the ranker can resist spamming
- **distortion:** a quality constraint on the ranker

Show that there is a ranking function with high resistance & low distortion!

- This is the version of PageRank actually used by Google

Lots of ancillary results about the algebra of PageRank

Formalize game between **web ranker  and **spammer** **

Define two critical criteria:

- **spam resistance:** how well the ranker can resist spamming
- **distortion:** a quality constraint on the ranker

Show that there is a ranking function with high resistance & low distortion!

- This is the version of PageRank actually used by Google

Lots of ancillary results about the algebra of PageRank

Formalize game between **web ranker**  and **spammer** 

Define two critical criteria:

- **spam resistance:** how well the ranker can resist spamming
- **distortion:** a quality constraint on the ranker

Show that there is a ranking function with high resistance & low distortion!

- This is the version of PageRank actually used by Google

Lots of ancillary results about the algebra of PageRank

Formalize game between **web ranker  and **spammer** **

Define two critical criteria:

- **spam resistance:** how well the ranker can resist spamming
- **distortion:** a quality constraint on the ranker

Show that there is a ranking function with high resistance & low distortion!

- This is the version of PageRank actually used by Google

Lots of ancillary results about the algebra of PageRank

Running Example: PageRank

Where did PageRank come from?

Brin & Page's insight:

- Good pages are pointed to by other good pages

How do you make that usable?

Where did PageRank come from?

Brin & Page's insight:

- Good pages are pointed to by other good pages

How do you make that usable?

Compute the Stationary Distribution of a Random Walk on the Web Graph

Where did PageRank come from?

Brin & Page's insight:

- Good pages are pointed to by other good pages

How do you make that usable?


Compute the Stationary Distribution of a Random Walk on the Web Graph

What's the relevance?

- We'll see that pages with high stationary distribution are pointed to by other pages with high stationary distribution

Definition:


Graph



1. Start at an arbitrary node
2. Take a random out edge
3. Go forever

Definition:


Graph



1. Start at an arbitrary node
2. Take a random out edge
3. Go forever

Definition:

Graph




1. Start at an arbitrary node
2. Take a random out edge
3. Go forever

Fraction of time at each node = stationary distribution

Pros:

- Reward having in-edges from high-quality pages
- Easy to compute




Stationary Distribution: Pros and Cons

Pros:

- Reward having in-edges from high-quality pages
- Easy to compute

Cons:

- Not defined on all graphs (only on ergodic graphs)
- Not defined for the web graph!




Stationary Distribution: Pros and Cons

Pros:

- Reward having in-edges from high-quality pages
- Easy to compute

Cons:

- Not defined on all graphs (only on ergodic graphs)
- Not defined for the web graph!




Stationary Distribution: Pros and Cons

Pros:

- Reward having in-edges from high-quality pages
- Easy to compute

Cons:

- Not defined on all graphs (only on ergodic graphs)
- Not defined for the web graph!




Stationary Distribution: Pros and Cons

Pros:

- Reward having in-edges from high-quality pages
- Easy to compute

Cons:

- Not defined on all graphs (only on ergodic graphs)
- Not defined for the web graph!



What does a grad student* do when their idea doesn't work?


Stationary Distribution: Pros and Cons

Pros:

- Reward having in-edges from high-quality pages
- Easy to compute

Cons:

- Not defined on all graphs (only on ergodic graphs)
- Not defined for the web graph!



What does a grad student* do when their idea doesn't work?


Come up with a workaround!

Pros:

- Reward having in-edges from high-quality pages
- Easy to compute

Cons:

- Not defined on all graphs (only on ergodic graphs)
- Not defined for the web graph!



What does a grad student* do when their idea doesn't work?


Come up with a workaround!

*NB: Grad students = Brin and Page

PageRank is the stationary distribution of a slightly different random walk

- Let *reset vector* r be a distribution over the nodes
- In the PageRank paper, $r = u$, the uniform distribution over the nodes



Web Graph



PageRank is the stationary distribution of a slightly different random walk

- Let *reset vector* r be a distribution over the nodes
- In the PageRank paper, $r = u$, the uniform distribution over the nodes



Web Graph



PageRank is the stationary distribution of a slightly different random walk

- Let *reset vector* r be a distribution over the nodes
- In the PageRank paper, $r = u$, the uniform distribution over the nodes


Web Graph




PageRank is the stationary distribution of a slightly different random walk

- Let *reset vector* r be a distribution over the nodes
- In the PageRank paper, $r = u$, the uniform distribution over the nodes

Web Graph



PageRank = stationary distribution



PageRank is the stationary distribution of a slightly different random walk

- Let *reset vector* r be a distribution over the nodes
- In the PageRank paper, $r = u$, the uniform distribution over the nodes

PageRank is defined for every graph! (unless $\varepsilon = 0$)

PageRank is the stationary distribution of a slightly different random walk

- Let *reset vector* r be a distribution over the nodes
- In the PageRank paper, $r = u$, the uniform distribution over the nodes


PageRank is defined for every graph! (unless $\varepsilon = 0$)

Types of PageRank:


- When $r = u$, it's called the *Uniform PageRank* (UPR)
- When $r[c] = 1$, for some *center* c , it's called *Personalized PageRank* (PPR_c)

Contribution: Spamming Game

What can the Ranker and Spammer do?




What can the Ranker and Spammer do?




Select a Ranking Function
(within reason)


What can the Ranker and Spammer do?




What can the Ranker and Spammer do?




What can the Ranker and Spammer do?




What can the Ranker and Spammer do?




What can the Ranker and Spammer do?



What can the Ranker and Spammer do?




What can the Ranker and Spammer do?




UPR Spamming


If ranker is using UPR, what should the spammer do?




If ranker is using UPR, what should the spammer do?




UPR



If ranker is using UPR, what should the spammer do?



UPR




PageRank will reset to new nodes quite often


So spammer can acquire as much rank as they want

With no expenditure!

If ranker is using UPR, what should the spammer do?



UPR




PageRank will reset to new nodes quite often

So spammer can acquire as much rank as they want


With no expenditure!

So total captured rank approaches 1.

If ranker is using UPR, what should the spammer do?



UPR



PageRank will reset to new nodes quite often

So spammer can acquire as much rank as they want


With no expenditure!

So total captured rank approaches 1.


This trivial vulnerability of UPR is why it was never used for web ranking at Google!

PPR Spamming

If ranker is using PPR, what should the spammer do?



If ranker is using PPR, what should the spammer do?




Spammer must acquire a high rank node

It can then divert random walks into it's own new nodes

Where they last for about $1/\epsilon$ steps before reseting to c

If ranker is using PPR, what should the spammer do?




Spammer must acquire a high rank node

It can then divert random walks into its own new nodes

Where they last for about $1/\epsilon$ steps before resetting to c

If ranker is using PPR, what should the spammer do?



Spammer must acquire a high rank node

It can then divert random walks into it's own new nodes

Where they last for about $1/\epsilon$ steps before resetting to c

So total captured rank is $PPR_c(d)/\epsilon$


A ranking function is σ -spam resistant if, for every graph

$$\frac{\text{Spammer's Cost}}{\text{Spammer's Benefit}} \geq \sigma$$

A ranking function is σ -spam resistant if, for every graph

$$\frac{\text{Spammer's Cost}}{\text{Spammer's Benefit}} \geq \sigma$$

Cost of spammer acquiring nodes




A ranking function is σ -spam resistant if, for every graph

$$\frac{\text{Spammer's Cost}}{\text{Spammer's Benefit}} \geq \sigma$$

Cost of spammer acquiring nodes

Sum of rank all nodes owned by spammer

A diagram illustrating the definition of spam resistance. It features a central inequality: $\frac{\text{Spammer's Cost}}{\text{Spammer's Benefit}} \geq \sigma$. An arrow points from the numerator, "Spammer's Cost", to the text "Cost of spammer acquiring nodes" above it. Another arrow points from the denominator, "Spammer's Benefit", to the text "Sum of rank all nodes owned by spammer" below it.

A ranking function is σ -spam resistant if, for every graph

$$\min_{\substack{\text{choice of free nodes,} \\ \text{aquired nodes, and edge changes}}} \frac{\text{Spammer's Cost}}{\text{Spammer's Benefit}} \geq \sigma$$

Cost of spammer acquiring nodes

Sum of rank all nodes owned by spammer

The diagram illustrates the definition of spam resistance. It features a central equation:
$$\min_{\substack{\text{choice of free nodes,} \\ \text{aquired nodes, and edge changes}}} \frac{\text{Spammer's Cost}}{\text{Spammer's Benefit}} \geq \sigma$$
 The equation is annotated with two arrows. One arrow points from the 'Spammer's Cost' numerator to the text 'Cost of spammer acquiring nodes'. The other arrow points from the 'Spammer's Benefit' denominator to the text 'Sum of rank all nodes owned by spammer'. The text 'choice of free nodes, aquired nodes, and edge changes' is positioned above the min operator.

A ranking function is σ -spam resistant if, for every graph

$$\max_{\text{choice of cost function}} \min_{\substack{\text{choice of free nodes,} \\ \text{aquired nodes, and edge changes}}} \frac{\text{Spammer's Cost}}{\text{Spammer's Benefit}} \geq \sigma$$

Cost of spammer acquiring nodes

Sum of rank all nodes owned by spammer

The diagram illustrates the definition of spam resistance. It features a central equation: $\max_{\text{choice of cost function}} \min_{\text{choice of free nodes, aquired nodes, and edge changes}} \frac{\text{Spammer's Cost}}{\text{Spammer's Benefit}} \geq \sigma$. Two arrows point from the terms in the equation to explanatory text. One arrow points from 'Spammer's Cost' to 'Cost of spammer acquiring nodes'. Another arrow points from 'Spammer's Benefit' to 'Sum of rank all nodes owned by spammer'.

A ranking function is σ -spam resistant if

$$\max_{\text{choice of cost function}} \min_{\text{spammer choices}} \frac{\text{Spammer's Cost}}{\text{Spammer's Benefit}} \geq \sigma$$


Lemma: UPR is 0-spam resistant

Theorem: PPR with reset probability ε is ε -spam resistant


- Conjecture: This is the best any PageRank can do over all choices of reset vectors

So why not use PPR?


What can the Ranker and Spammer do?



What can the Ranker and Spammer do?



The nodes just downstream of c get very high rank



Following Brin & Page:

- On ergodic graphs, stationary distribution is the **reference** rank

We define *distortion* as the max multiplicative error vs reference rank

$$\max_{\text{ergodic graphs } G=(V,E)} \max_{v \in V} \max \left\{ \overset{\text{stretch}}{\frac{\text{rank of } v}{\text{reference rank of } v}}, \overset{\text{contraction}}{\frac{\text{reference rank of } v}{\text{rank of } v}} \right\}^*$$

*for technical reasons, we round up all ranks to something reasonable like $1/n^{O(1)}$

Theorem: UPR has poor spam resistance and poor distortion

Theorem: PPR has good spam resistance and poor distortion

Theorem: UPR has poor spam resistance and poor distortion

Theorem: PPR has good spam resistance and poor distortion

That's progress, but still need to deal with distortion

Theorem: UPR has poor spam resistance and poor distortion

Theorem: PPR has good spam resistance and poor distortion

That's progress, but still need to deal with distortion

What does a grad student* do when their idea doesn't work?

Theorem: UPR has poor spam resistance and poor distortion

Theorem: PPR has good spam resistance and poor distortion

That's progress, but still need to deal with distortion

What does a grad student* do when their idea doesn't work?

Come up with a workaround!

Theorem: UPR has poor spam resistance and poor distortion

Theorem: PPR has good spam resistance and poor distortion

That's progress, but still need to deal with distortion



What does a grad student* do when their idea doesn't work?

Come up with a workaround!


*Again, Brin and Page!

Workaround to fix
distortion of PPR

Compute two PPRs: one with center c and one with center d






Compute two PPRs: one with center c and one with center d



Compute the (normalized) component-wise min!


Compute two PPRs: one with center c and one with center d



Compute the component-wise min!

- PPR_c will kill distortion around d and vice versa


Compute two PPRs: one with center c and one with center d



Compute the component-wise min!

- PPR_c will kill distortion around d and vice versa

Compute two PPRs: one with center c and one with center d



Compute the component-wise min!

- PPR_c will kill distortion around d and vice versa

And now for main
theorems

Theorem: For almost all choices of centers, Min-PPR has low distortion!

- Almost all = from a sensible distribution (see paper)


Theorem: For almost all choices of centers, Min-PPR has low distortion!

- Almost all = from a sensible distribution (see paper)


Theorem: Min-PPR with k centers is ε/k -spam resistant!


- So if k is small, Min-PPR is almost as spam resistant as PPR
- And the proof gives a concrete (natural) cost function
- The cost function tells the rankers where to spend their spam-detection efforts

One last thing




When is a ranking a PageRank?







If we fix ε , then we can invert from p to r_p




Theorem: p is a PageRank iff the computed r_p has no negative values.





Fun fact about PageRank and component-wise min







Fun fact about PageRank and component-wise min






Fun fact about PageRank and component-wise min







Fun fact about PageRank and component-wise min



Theorem: p^* is a PageRank (or all 0) (eqv., r^* is non-negative)



Fun fact about PageRank and component-wise min



Theorem: PageRank vectors is closed under norm. component-wise min

We formalize web ranker-spammer interaction as a game

We formalize web ranker-spammer interaction as a game

We observe that all ranking functions in the literature have poor distortion or poor spam resistance (or both)

We formalize web ranker-spammer interaction as a game

We observe that all ranking functions in the literature have poor distortion or poor spam resistance (or both)

We prove that the heuristic used by Google has good resistance and good distortion

- Technical nugget: we use the closure property of PageRank extensively in our proofs

More work to be done on the web ranking spamming game

- Formalize setting the cost function?

Spamming is ubiquitous. Can we analyze games for:

- Wikipedia spamming?
- Citation spamming? H-index spamming?

More work to be done on the web ranking spamming game

- Formalize setting the cost function?

Spamming is ubiquitous. Can we analyze games for:

- Wikipedia spamming?
- Citation spamming? H-index spamming?

Goodhart's Law

When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.

More work to be done on the web ranking spamming game

- Formalize setting the cost function?

Spamming is ubiquitous. Can we analyze games for:

- Wikipedia spamming?
- Citation spamming? H-index spamming?

Goodhart's Law

When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.
(unless you can prove spam resistance)